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IV 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has pour over jurisdiction from the Utah Supreme Court under 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does the Utah Dramshop Act preempt plaintiffs' "first party" 
common law claim for the sale of alcohol to Robert Miller who allegedly died as a result 
ofhis voluntary intoxication? This issue is reviewed for correctness. Adkinsv. Uncle 
Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000). 
2. If plaintiffs' claim is not preempted, does Utah common law allow a 
"first party" claim against an alcohol provider. That is, may a claim be brought when a 
person voluntarily obtains and consumes alcohol from an alcohol provider and 
subsequently injures or kills himself as a result ofhis excessive alcohol consumption. 
This issue is reviewed for correctness. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 
2000). 
STATUTES DETERMINATIVE OF APPEAL 
The Utah Alcoholic Beverage Liability Act § 32A- 14(a)-101 through 105. 
(Full text of the Act included in the Appendix). 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that their decedent, Robert Miller, asked for 
and was served an excessive amount of alcohol at defendant's restaurant and private club. 
Mr. Miller subsequently crashed his car and was killed. Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts a 
wrongful death claim based upon negligence in serving excessive alcohol. 
Plaintiffs claim is referred to as a "first party" Dramshop claim because the 
person injured or killed voluntarily drank to excess and injured himself. The claim is 
distinct from "third party" claims which involve a person becoming intoxicated and then 
injuring or killing some other person. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the Complaint based on the pleadings. 
Following a hearing on the Motion, Judge Medley dismissed the case based 
upon two grounds: 
1. Preemption by the Dramshop statutes which preclude a first party 
claim where a person's injuries result from his own voluntary consumption of alcohol; 
2. Utah case law establishing that there is no common law negligence 
claim for injuries to a person who voluntarily drinks to excess. 
Plaintiffs appealed Judge Medley's Order to the Utah Supreme Court. That 
appeal was poured over to this Court on March 23, 2004. 
2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because this matter was disposed of upon the Motion for Judgement on the 
Pleadings, all facts properly asserted in plaintiffs' Complaint are accepted as true for the 
purpose of this appeal. 
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges that on August 10, 2002 Robert Miller, age 48, 
had dinner and nine glasses of wine at defendants' establishments known as the Market 
Street Grill and the Oyster Bar private club in Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. pgs. 2 and 3). 
The Complaint alleges that by the time he paid his last tab, he was clearly intoxicated. (R. 
pg. 3). The Complaint further alleges that 30 minutes after leaving defendants' 
establishment, Mr. Miller died in a one car accident that resulted from his voluntary 
intoxication. (R. pgs. 3 and 4). 
The Complaint seeks damages under the Utah Wrongful Death Act (Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-11-7) and the Utah Survival of Actions Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-
12). Plaintiffs are the parents and only heirs of Robert Miller. (R. pg. 2). The Complaint 
states claims for relief based upon negligence. It alleges that Robert Miller ordered and 
was served alcohol when defendants should have known he was intoxicated. It alleges 
that defendant violated the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act and that defendant should 
have monitored his alcohol consumption and not allowed him to drive. (R. pgs. 4 and 5). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case involves a circumstance in which an adult voluntarily chose to 
consume nine glasses of wine. He chose to drive while intoxicated. He caused an 
accident and was killed. He did not injure any third party. Plaintiffs assert a "first party" 
claim against the provider of alcohol. That is, they ask the Court to recognize a tort under 
which a person of legal age is able to voluntarily consume excessive amounts of alcohol 
and then sue the provider for whatever injury he does to himself. 
The Utah Dramshop statute establishes when claims may be asserted against 
providers of alcohol. The Act only allows claims in certain specified circumstances. 
Interpreting the Act's provisions, the Utah Supreme Court has found that the Dramshop 
Act does not provide for the first party claim that plaintiffs are asserting. In subsequent 
case law, the Court has found that because of its comprehensive scope, the Act is properly 
determined to preempt any separate claims for negligence against alcohol providers who 
serve drinks for consumption on the premises. Plaintiffs claim was therefore properly 
dismissed under the doctrine of preemption. 
Even if the preemption did not apply, there is no common law claim in this 
case. The Utah Supreme Court, following established common law principles, has 
consistently rejected any argument that common law Dramshop claims exist against an 
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establishment that provides alcohol for consumption on the premises. The only common 
law claim against an alcohol provider that the Court has ever allowed are in 
circumstances where a store sold beer to a minor and a subsequent accident resulted 
injuring a third party. Those cases have no application in this matter. 
While a limited number of States have allowed "first party" claims against 
an alcoholic provider, a strong majority of States have rejected such an extension of the 
common law. It runs counter to basic principles of personal responsibility and proximate 
cause. Utah has remained with the majority of States by rejecting such a cause of action. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS IN THIS CASE ARE BARRED BY PREEMPTION 
UNDER THE DRAMSHOP STATUTE. 
A. Plaintiffs have no claim under the Dramshop Statute. 
The Utah Dramshop Statute applicable in this case is found at § 32(a)-
14(a)-102. The statute provides for a cause of action against a provider of alcohol who 
serves an intoxicated person. However, liability is specifically restricted to damage 
suffered by a "third person." The Utah Supreme Court has determined that when a 
customer of a Dramshop becomes intoxicated and is subsequently killed due to his own 
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drunken driving, there is no claim. Richardson v. Matador Steak House, Inc., 948 P.2d 
347 (Utah 1997). 
In Richardson, the plaintiffs were the heirs of 20 year old Berdette 
Richardson. Berdette, although underage, was served alcohol at the Matador's premises. 
After leaving the Matador, she drove her car while intoxicated. She lost control and was 
killed in the crash. 
Plaintiffs asserted a claim under the Utah Dramshop Act. On appeal, the 
Utah Supreme Court, ruled that the Dramshop Act did not apply to the heirs of a person 
who becomes drunk and injures or kills herself. The Court found that the Act limited 
recovery to those third persons who were hurt or killed by the drunk driver. There was no 
claim under the Act for the drunk herself or her heirs. 
The heirs of Robert Miller stand in precisely the same position as that of the 
heirs of Berdette Richardson. Robert Miller asked for and consumed alcohol that 
allegedly caused his intoxication. He subsequently chose to drive while drunk. He died 
in the resulting accident. The Dramshop statute does not allow recovery against the 
Dramshop by his heirs. 
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B. The Dramshop Statute Preempts All Common Law Claims Against 
Businesses That Sell Alcohol for Consumption on the Premises. 
In Richardson, the Utah Supreme Court specifically left open the question 
of whether or not the Dramshop statute preempts any common law claim against an 
alcohol provider for consumption on the premises. The Court specifically addressed that 
issue in the subsequent case of Gilger v. Hernandez, 997 P.2d 305 (Utah 2000). That 
case analyzed the question of preemption under the Dramshop Act in detail. The Court 
concluded that although the Act did not specifically reference preemption, it did preempt 
any common law claims against providers of alcohol for consumption on the premises. 
The Court stated: 
The act evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability 
for liquor providers. Its very comprehensiveness suggests a 
purpose and intent to preempt inconsistent common law. 
Gilger, 997 P.2d at 309. 
The Gilger case involved a "party" hosted by defendant. She charged her 
guests $5.00 for all the beer they wanted to drink. One of the minors at the party became 
intoxicated and belligerent. He ultimately stabbed the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued 
Hernandez alleging common law negligence based upon her act of providing alcohol to a 
minor which caused him to be intoxicated and continuing to provide alcohol after he was 
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drunk. As in the present case, Gilger argued that the defendant had violated the Alcohol 
Beverage Control Act by serving a person who was drunk. 
The Supreme Court made a careful review of the Dramshop Act. It 
concluded that under the provisions of the Act then in effect (it had been changed 
subsequently) the Act did not apply to social hosts who served beer. It only provided 
liability for social hosts who supply "liquor." The Court concluded that because of the 
statutory definition of "liquor," there was no social host Dramshop liability for serving 
beer. 
Gilger then argued that if the Act did not impose liability on a social host 
who served beer, then it did not preempt his claim for negligence liability against a social 
host serving beer. The Court rejected Gilger's arguments and stated as follows: 
The Act has specifically excluded from its civil liability 
provisions social hosts who served their guests only beer. 
Given the obviousness of this category of providers of beer, 
we find it equally obvious that social hosts were not 
unintentionally excluded from the Dramshop Acts' reach. 
The exclusion from Dramshop liability was explicit and as 
knowingly crafted as the inclusion of other providers of 
alcohol. The Act evidences an overall scheme of regulation 
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of liability for liquor providers. Its very comprehensiveness 
suggests a purpose and intent to preempt inconsistent 
common law. 
Gilger, 997 P.2d at 309. 
Plaintiffs argument in the present case is substantially identical to the 
argument made by Gilger. Plaintiff has suggested that because the Act excludes recovery 
for first party claims that therefore preemption cannot apply. Plaintiff is asking this Court 
to ignore the far broader discussion of the doctrine of preemption presented by the 
Supreme Court in the Gilger case. Based upon its review of the law and history of the 
Dramshop Act, in Gilger, the Supreme Court found that the statute was intended as an 
"overall scheme for regulation of liability of liquor providers." Therefore, preemption 
applied. 
The fact that the Act did not provide a cause of action against social 
providers of beer did not mean that plaintiffs would be allowed to make that claim as a 
general negligence claim. To the contrary, that claim by Gilger was "preempted." The 
same reasoning applies to plaintiffs in this case who have asserted first party liability 
which is also not permitted by the Act. 
The Dramshop Act preempts all causes of action against those businesses or 
social hosts who provide alcoholic beverages for consumption on the premises. The Act 
9 
specifically excludes liability for the State through its operation of liquor stores. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 32A-14A-104. The Act further excludes application to stores that sell beer 
for off-premises consumption, such as a general food store, convenience store, etc. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14A-102(9). However, the remaining providers of alcohol which 
are those that provide alcohol for consumption on the premises are encompassed by the 
Act. The Act preempts any common law claim against those providers. Accordingly, 
plaintiffs' claims in this case are preempted by the Act. 
POINT II 
UNDER UTAH LAW, A PERSON WHO VOLUNTARILY CONSUMES 
ALCOHOL CANNOT SUBSEQUENTLY MAKE A NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
AGAINST THE PROVIDER FOR INJURIES RESULTING FROM HIS 
VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION. 
As noted above, the Dramshop statute preempts any common law claim 
against an alcohol provider. However, Utah law has found that even in the absence of 
such preemption, there is no common law claim against an alcohol provider. 
The law was summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Beach 
v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986). In a footnote to that opinion, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
The Dramshop Act allows third parties to recover from those 
improperly providing liquor, but does not allow the 
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intoxicated person to recover from the provider. Therefore, 
one injured as a result of his or her own voluntary but 
unlawful intoxication would appear to be without remedy 
against the provider of the alcohol, either under the Dramshop 
Act or under common law. 
Beach, 726 P.2dat417. 
Under historic common law, there was no claim against a provider of 
alcohol. This conclusion was based upon a lack of proximate cause. As summarized in 
Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, Inc., 1 P.3d 528 (Utah 2000): 
At common law, third parties did not generally have a cause 
of action against Dramshops that provided alcohol to another 
who became intoxicated and caused personal injury [citation]. 
The legal theory behind the general rule is that when a third 
party is injured by an inebriated individual, it is the drinking 
of the alcohol not the furnishing of it, which proximately 
causes the injuries. 
Adkins, 1 P.3d at 532. 
The Adkins case went on to specifically conclude that no common law 
negligence claim could be made against an alcohol provider regardless of whether that 
claim was based on general negligence principles or on a violation of the Liquor Control 
Act. As in the present case, in Adkins, plaintiffs argued that the bars involved had 
violated specific provisions of the Liquor Control Act which prohibited serving alcohol to 
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a person who was already intoxicated. Adkins argued that the violation of that section 
was evidence of negligence per se and therefore stated a cause of action against the bars. 
The Utah Supreme Court disagreed. The only private right of action for 
damages in the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act was found in the Dramshop liability 
statute. The Court reiterated the fact that there was no common law claim against 
Dramshops: 
We conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing 
plaintiffs claim brought under § 32A-5-107 of the Liquor 
Control Act. Plaintiffs remedy, if any, must be found in the 
Dramshop Act. 
Adkins, 1 P.3dat533. 
The Adkins Court was very clear in rejecting common law claims against 
alcohol providers, stating: 
We therefore conclude that because a third party cause of 
action against Dramshops did not exist in this State at 
common law, plaintiffs common law negligence claim against 
the Dramshop defendants was properly dismissed by the trial 
court. 
Adkins, 1 P.3dat533. 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to restrict the Adkins reasoning to "third party" 
claims. Under this illogical argument plaintiffs acknowledge that the common law 
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recognized no cause of action in favor of an innocent third party who was injured by a 
drunk patron. But, plaintiffs argue that the common law would recognize a cause of 
action in favor of a person who wrongfully drinks to excess and then injures himself. 
Such an argument is inconsistent with the reasoning of the Adkins case and basic common 
sense. Why would the common law reward the person who violates the law and causes 
injury to himself while denying recovery to an innocent person? 
As quoted from Beach, the Court has specifically stated that a person 
injured by his or her own voluntary intoxication would have no remedy under the 
common law against an alcoholic provider. Plaintiffs argument in this case is not only 
illogical, but also runs directly counter to the summary of the law by the Supreme Court 
in Beach. 
A. The Rees and Yost Cases Provide No Support for Plaintiffs9 Claim. 
Much of plaintiffs' brief on appeal is devoted to their argument that the 
cases of Rees v. Albertsons, 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978) and Yost v. State of Utah, 640 P.2d 
1044 (Utah 1981) somehow provide a basis for finding a common law right of action for 
a first party plaintiff who becomes voluntarily intoxicated and injures himself. These 
cases do not support such claims. They both relate to a third party claim against a retail 
13 
store which sold beer to a minor. As noted above, such claims are specifically exempted 
from the Dramshop statute at § 32A-14A-102(9). 
In the Rees case, Craig Rees bought four 6-packs of beer from an 
Albertsons' store. Thereafter he bought a fifth of liquor from a State store. He and his 
three friends drank the alcohol. He drove through Logan Canyon where he lost control of 
the car hitting a tree. His friends riding with him were injured or killed. They or their 
heirs asserted claims against Rees. These claims were settled. The case was an action for 
contribution against Albertsons alleging that it was negligent in its sale of the alcohol and 
should pay part of the settlement. It predated the Liability Reform Act of 1986 so that 
joint and several liability applied and contribution claims were allowed. 
Albertsons was being sued for contribution alleging that it was a joint tort-
feasor with regard to the claims of the injured third parties. There was no claim asserted 
by Rees against Albertsons for his own injury as a first party claim against the alcohol 
provider. The claims at issue were all third party claims. 
The Yost case is essentially identical. In Yost, Steve Hammon, an 18 year 
old, was the one who had purchased the beer and was driving the vehicle when the 
accident occurred. Yost who was riding in the vehicle was hurt in the accident. He sued 
Hammon and the businesses and entities that had sold the alcohol to Hammon. It was a 
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third party claim based upon a sale of beer by a store to an underage purchaser. Relying 
on the Rees case, the Court allowed the claim. 
Neither the Rees nor Yost cases involved any recognition of a first party 
claim against an alcohol provider. Plaintiffs' citation ofHorton v. Royal Order of the 
Sun, 821 P.2d 1167 (Utah 1991) to suggest that either of these cases recognized first party 
claims is wrong. There were no first party claims in the cases. 
The limited scope of the Rees and Yost cases was recognized by the Utah 
Supreme Court in MacKay v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp,, 995 P.2d 1233 (Utah 2000). That 
case, which was decided at virtually the same time as Gilger and Adkins, summarized the 
Rees and Yost cases as follows: 
These two cases recognize a cause of action in favor of a third 
person against a vendor of alcohol who sells the same 
negligently and in violation of a statute to an underage 
purchaser, who becomes intoxicated and causes injury to a 
third person. 
Mac/STay, 995 P.2d at 1235. 
The MacKay decision noted the specific statutory exemption from the 
Dramshop Act for claims involving retail sale of beer by stores. The case again involved 
a third party claim based upon the sale of beer from a convenience store to a minor. It has 
nothing to do with any first party claim. 
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The Rees and Yost cases were specifically discussed in Adkins. They did 
not change the Adkins' Court conclusion that in the case of a bar serving excessive 
amounts to an intoxicated patron, "plaintiffs had no cause of action under the Liquor 
Control Act or at common law based on negligence." 1 P.3d at 537. 
B. Case Law from Other Jurisdictions Strongly Supports the Rule That There 
Is No First Party Claim Against an Alcohol Provider. 
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that there is no common 
law claim against a seller of alcohol for consumption on the premises. Plaintiffs' brief 
has suggested this Court should turn to cases outside the State to somehow justify such a 
claim in the first party context. Plaintiffs' lead case in this regard, Lyons v. Nasby, 770 
P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1989) was not adopted or followed by the Utah Supreme Court in its 
three decisions on alcohol liability in 2000: Adkins, Gilger and MacKay. The decision 
was founded on Colorado law, that unlike Utah law, allowed a third party negligence 
claim against a liquor provider. See Lango Corp. v. Crespin, 727 P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986). 
The Lyons case, however, is an aberration in Colorado law. It was a four to 
three split decision of the Colorado Supreme Court which overturned a unanimous 
decision of the underlying appellate Court that rejected such liability. Additionally, the 
Colorado Legislature, subsequent to the events of Lyons, had specifically eliminated any 
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common law claim for first party liability by statute. The lengthy dissent in Lyons, 
written by Justice Rovira and joined by two of his fellow Justices, outlines what is the 
majority position across the Country regarding claims of first party liability against 
Dramshops. Summarizing his view, Justice Rovira stated: 
The concerns of public policy do not extend to protect an 
intoxicated adult from the results of his own intoxication. A 
person who intends to drink, before he picks up that first glass 
of liquor, should be aware that he is solely responsible for 
whatever havoc he may wreak upon himself. To give such 
person a cause of action against the provider shifts the 
responsibility from the imbiber, and says that to this extent the 
consumer need not be responsible. Any shifting of the blame 
from the intoxicated person, especially an intoxicated driver, 
is contrary to sound public policy. 
Lyons, 770 P.2d 1262 (Rouira, J., dissenting). 
Such reasoning is entirely consistent with the law of the State of Utah. A 
person who is voluntarily intoxicated is nevertheless fully responsible for his own actions 
in tort. A drunk driver cannot avoid a DUI citation by explaining that he was drunk and 
therefore not in proper control of his faculties. In fact, not only is a drunk driver who 
injures another person fully responsible for the consequences of his tort, but he is also 
likely liable for punitive damages. Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-l(l)(b). 
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In Bridges v. Park Place Entertainment, 860 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 2003), the 
Mississippi Supreme Court surveyed and summarized case law from throughout the 
United States regarding the issue of first party claims against Dramshops. It rejected such 
claims. It reviewed a lengthy list of controlling cases throughout the Country that 
rejected such claims. The decision concluded: "a majority of the States which have 
addressed this issue do not recognize a first party cause of action against the vendor of 
alcoholic beverages" while noting "only a small minority of jurisdictions have extended 
the liability of the seller of the intoxicants to allow a cause of action in favor of the 
intoxicated adult." Bridges, 860 So. 2d at 817. 
Utah, in Beach and Adkins, has followed the majority position. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah's law regarding first party claims against a Dramshop was succinctly 
summarized in the case of Beach v. University of Utah: 
One injured as a result of his or her own voluntary but 
unlawful intoxication would appear to be without remedy 
against the provider of the alcohol, either under the Dramshop 
Act or under common law. 
This rule was reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court in Adkins, Gilger and 
MacKay in January, 2000. This group of three cases stands for the proposition that the 
Dramshop statute has preempted all common law with regard to liability of bars and 
18 
restaurants that sell alcohol for consumption on the premises. There is no common law 
claim to be made against such an alcohol provider. 
Utah's established law is consistent with the majority of the cases across the 
Country and common sense. Plaintiffs Complaint was properly dismissed. 
DATED this fj> day of September, 2004. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSJ3N / 
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DRAMSHOP LIABILITY [RENUMBERED] 
32a-14-101,32a-14-102. Renumbered as § §32A-14a-102 
and32A-14a-104. 2000 
CHAPTER 14a 
ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE LIABILITY 
Section 
32 A-14a-101. Definitions. 
32A-14a-102. Liability for injuries and damage resulting from distribution 
of alcoholic beverages — Causes of action - Statute of 
limitations — Employee protections. 
32A-14a-103. Employee protected in exercising judgement. 
32A-14a-104. Governmental immunity. 
32A-14a-105. Action for contribution by provider of alcoholic beverages. 
32A-14a-101. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Death of a third person" includes recovery for all damages, special and 
general, resulting from such death, except punitive damages. 
(2) (a) "Injury" includes injury in person, property, or means of support, 
(b) "Injury" also includes recovery for intangibles such as mental 
and emotional injuries, loss of affection, and companionship. 2000 
32A-14a-102. Liability for injuries and damage resulting from distribution of 
alcoholic beverages — Causes of action — Statute of limitations — 
Employee protections. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Section 32A-14a-103, a person described in 
Subsection (l)(b) is liable for: 
(i) any and all injury and damage, except punitive damages to: 
(A) any third person; or 
(B) the heir, as defined in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third 
person; or 
(ii) for the death of a third person, 
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (l)(a) if: 
(i) the person directly gives, sells, or otherwise provides an alcoholic 
beverage: 
(A) to a person described in Subsection (l)(b)(ii); and 
(B) as part of the commercial sale, storage, service, 
manufacture, distribution, or consumption of alcoholic 
products; 
(ii) those actions cause the intoxication of: 
(A) any individual under the age of 21 years; 
(B) any individual who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic products or drugs; 
(C) any individual whom the person furnishing the alcoholic 
beverage knew or should have known from the circumstances 
was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or 
products or drugs; or 
(D) any individual who is a known interdicted person; and 
(iii) the injury or death described in Subsection (l)(a) results 
from the intoxication of the individual who is provided the 
alcoholic beverage. 
(2) (a) A person 21 years of age or older who is described in Subsection (2)(b) 
is liable for: 
(i) any and all injury and damage, except punitive damages to: 
(A) any third person; or 
(B) the heir, as defined in Section 78-11-6.5, of that third 
person; or 
(ii) for the death of the third person, 
(b) A person is liable under Subsection (2)(a) if: 
(i) that person directly gives or otherwise provides an alcoholic 
beverage to an individual who the person knows or should have 
known is under the age of 21 years; 
(ii) those actions caused the intoxication of the individual provided 
the alcoholic beverage; 
(iii) the injury or death described in Subsection (2)(a) results from 
the intoxication of the individual who is provided the alcoholic 
beverage; and 
(iv) the person is not liable under Subsection (1), because the person 
did not directly give or provide the alcoholic beverage as part of the 
commercial sale, storage, service, manufacture, distribution, or 
consumption of alcoholic products. 
(3) Except for a violation of Subsection (2), an employer is liable for the actions 
of its employees in violation of this chapter. 
(4) A person who suffers an injury under Subsection (1) or (2) has a cause of 
action against the person who provided the alcoholic beverage in violation of Subsection 
(l)or(2). 
(5) If a person having rights or liabilities under this chapter dies, the rights or 
liabilities provided by this chapter survive to or against that person's estate. 
(6) The total amount that may be awarded to any person pursuant to a cause of 
action for injury and damage under this chapter that arises after January 1, 1998, is 
limited to $500,000 and the aggregate amount which may be awarded to all persons 
injured as a result of one occurrence is limited to $1,000,000. 
(7) An action based upon a cause of action under this chapter shall be commenced 
within two years after the date of the injury and damage. 
(8) (a) Nothing in this chapter precludes any cause of action or additional 
recovery against the person causing the injury. 
(b) Any cause of action or additional recovery against the person causing 
the injury and damage, which action is not brought under this chapter, is 
exempt from the damage cap in Subsection (6). 
(c) Any cause of action brought under this chapter is exempt from Sections 
78-27-37 through 78-27-43. 
(9) This section does not apply to a general food store or other establishment 
licensed under Chapter 10, Part 1, to sell beer at retail for off-premise consumption. 2000 
32A-14a-103. Employee protected in exercising judgment. 
(1) An employer may not sanction or terminate the employment of an employee of 
a restaurant, airport lounge, private club, on-premise beer retailer, or any other 
establishment serving alcoholic beverages as a result of the employee having exercised 
the employee's independent judgment to refuse to sell alcoholic beverages to any person 
the employee considers to meet one or more of the conditions described in Subsection 
32A-14a-102(l). 
(2) Any employer who terminates an employee or imposes sanctions on the 
employee contrary to this section is considered to have discriminated against that 
employee and is subject to the conditions and penalties set forth in Title 34A, Chapter 5, 
Utah Antidiscrimination Act. 
2000 
32A-14a-104. Governmental immunity. 
No provision of this title creates any civil liability on the part of the state or its 
agencies and employees, the commission, the department, or any political subdivision 
arising out of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being 
involved in the sale or other distribution of alcoholic beverages. 2000 
32A-14a-105. Action for contribution by provider of alcoholic beverages. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), a person, as 
defined under Subsection 32A- 14a-102(1), (2), or (3), against whom an 
award has been made under this chapter, may bring a separate cause of 
action for contribution against any person causing the injury and damage. 
(b) The maximum amount for which any person causing the injury 
and damage may be liable to any person seeking contribution is that 
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the percentage or 
proportion of fault attributed to that person causing the injury and damage. 
(2) This action for contribution under this section may not be brought against: 
(a) any person entitled to recovery as described in Subsection 
32A-14a-102(l)(a)(i) or (ii); or 
(b) any person entitled to recover as described in Subsection 
32A-14a-102(2)(a)(i)or(ii). 
(3) An action for contribution under this section may not diminish the amount of 
recovery for injury or damages awarded and received to any person entitled to 
recover as described in Subsection 32A-14a-102(l)(a)(i) or (ii) or 
32A-14a-102(2)(a)(i)or(ii): 
(a) in a cause of action brought under this chapter; or 
(b) in a separate cause of action for injury and damage that is not 
brought under this chapter. 2000 
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